Response to balance of payments crises in the 1970s : Korea and the Philippines by Power, J.H.
RESPONSE TO BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CRISES
IN THE ]_970's:KOREA
AND THE PHILIPPINES
JoHo Power
STAFF PAPER SERIES NO. 83-05
Response to Balance of Payments
.Crises in the 1970's: Korea and the Philippines
John H. Power*
Korea and the Philippines today are among the East Asian countrie_
most heavily burdened with external debt. This is a result, of course,
of heavy borrowing to finance current account defici=s it, the 1970's.
How Co account for these deficits ar_i an analysis of the two countries'
re_pon_es and their consequences is the subject of thi_ paper.
Taking balance of payments crisis to mean a sharp rise in the
current account deficit, fin_ced by running down foreign exchange
reserves or external borrowing, two period_ of crisis have been identified
for both countries, 1974-7-I and 1979-82. While the focu_ is on theme
periods the analysis is put in the perspective also of the trends of
the preceding decade.
*Professor of Economics, l}niver_ity of 8awaii and llnited Nations
Developmemt Programme consultant to the Philippine Institute £or
l_velopw_nt Stodies. I am grateful to Dr. Dal H. Rim of the &_ian
Develop_nt Bank for sti_mlatin_ dis =ussions on the subject of this
paper.
1. Balance o_ Payments Cri.qes in the 1970'a:
Korea _-d the Philippine..
Both Korea and the Phi lippines, along with much of the rest of the
world, suffered sharp increases in their current acco,mt deficits
following the two oil price _hocks in 1974 and 1979-80. Th_.s can be
seen in Tables I and 2 where to gain a better perspective the deficit_
are also put as proportion_ of "trade" -_ the _imple _vera_e of exports
and imports.
Kafea'm defici.t jumped to about 30 per cent of trade, in 1974-750
compared to an average of 20 per cent in the previous three years. Thin,
hoverer, understates the extent of the ctlange, since the flef_.c;;t had
dropped sharply from 40 pez cex_ in 1971 to only seven percent' in J973,
so that. the sharp rise represented an even sharper ceversa[ of a t:r_nd.
In the first year (1974), Korea's £t_te-cnat:ionalreserves_ which ha<]
been rising sharply, showed a slight decline absolutely and a s,_bs_an_inl
decline in relation [o trade. External indebtedness continued ro grow
rapidly, but it also declined as a proportion of trade. The reason was a
remarkable 50 per cer_t increase is Korea's trade in one year. Mo_t _f
this was accounted for by the rise in tj_e trade uni.t value (average of
import and export unit values)which rose 3g per cent. !eavin_ oDly abo_,'._
eight per cent for real growth, l_is was followed by a modest.,six per cent
growth in trade the following year, helped by a decline in trade unit yah,e,
This helps to explain the movement of the ratios to trade of the deficit,
reserves and indebtedness in 1974 anti 1975, The upshot is_ however, that
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despite the relatively large deficits of the two year_ Korea found i.tse!f
only s!.i_htly worse off with respect to reserves ,as a proport_.on of. trade
and slightly better off wit.h respect to ext.er.n_l i.ndebtedne._, (_:ee.Tabl,- I.
This suggests that,, wh_.le the picture might fit the definition of ;tL_l;_nce
of payments crisis, i.t was hardly a r_Rjor one.
Wh_t. _._ really _[rnpressi._e, however, i..qtb_ rapid r,_oovery of th_
current account in _he _ext t_ years_ resulting in _J very slight surl)[,_s
xn 1977. F;._serves improved stronBl.y _ bo_h absolutely and in relation to
trade; and while indebtedness _"onti.t,;ed to grow,it declined, as a propo,'tio_
of tfade.
'ibis picture was reversed a_ain, in 1978, a yea_ befere the Second
oll .,.d_ock,r_i_o._gY_tho ri_e in the deficit _¢_.,_n.<>t:__ sharp n_ in [¢#14_aud
be.c.._useof the treme_dou_ growth of both exports and imports over four
year_,, it represented only s.i.X per cen.t of trade, StJ.l.1 it was a, rever,_al
and international reserves mace again failed t(_ grow wi.th grade.
l_debtedne_s, on the other band, rose slightly les:_ than i.n.proportion to
trade. Nevertheles_,. the inci-eese '.inindebtedness was 30 per eemt f_r the
year as trade grew even f._ster_ dominated by a 38 per cent i.ncrease i.n
imports (31 per cent in volume).
Should we, then, ¢onsxder the second balance of paymeet,_ c¢[_is ;._s
beginning in 1.978 rather than in !979 after £h_ ¢>ii shock? Other evidence
s,ugges[s not., "I_e s,!rge in imports, noted above_ was dominated by
meehinery and _ransportequipment, which rose 69 per cent, arid bsg_.c
manufactures, _hi.eh ro_e 46 per cent. Thesecomplemented the sharp rise
.in gross [ixed inve._tn_.nto_ .59 per cent',in current pri.ceq, _"_ch
..accompanied the government'_ policy thrust to faw_r heavy and cbemica.l
industries. GDP rose at a fa_,t_r rate than the avecaRe for the precedin?,
seven years, while _lemplovment reached a record _ow for the decade of
3.2 per cent, compared to an average of 4,2 per cent during 1970-77.
It seems, then, that the current acco_N.ntdeficit in ,1978 was a
. _ - r I ii i . . I i,
res,ul.t ,.O,f a domestic investment boom, rather than an externa.l shock.
For this reason, in.the _ubsequent analysis _he-f,irst balaoce of payme_ut,q
£risis pc.tied will. be taken as 1974-77, and the second wi'l] cover 1979-82.
This leaves 1978 out of both periods asa year o_ internal shock.
In any ca_e, the current account deficit quadrupled in ]979, more
O,an tripling as a proportion of trade. This time there was rio quack
tee.every, however, as the deficit rose further in 1980 and ro.a_ined above
ti_ 1979 level in 198[. By 1982 the deficit was do_en to haIY the peak
19[tO ie..ael, b_#t more than two _nd a half times that 'of' 1978. Aq a
proportion of trade, however, i.twas dOWn to o:i.gbtper cent, compared
to the peak of 21 per cent in 1980.
Indebtedness continued to grow but not m,ch faster than trade, so
that the ratio rose only slightly and remained low compared to the
early years of the decade. Reserves, surprisingly, continued tO grow,
though at a far,idly diminishing rate. By 1982 the ratio of reserve.- to
trade was down to 23 per cent. compared t:o a high o{ 33 per cent in 1977.
The year 1980 deserves special comment, particularly since some o_
the later analysis could be misread w_thout some understanding of the
special circumstances that characterized that year. I will l_.mit the
comment _0 three points. First, real GNP not only failed to grow, but
_etual].y declined between 1979 and 1980. The pri, nc!p_l reason _as crop
failure, dominated by a 36 per cent drop in rice production. A les_
important factor was the effect on it_vestn_.t of a brief period of
political tmcertaiety following the assassination of the President.
The significance of this is that the decline iv. GNP and its effect
.through imports on the trade balance cannot be attributed to _ gover,ment
policy response to the external shock. The volume of _Iports did decline,
but less than might have been expected because of a surge in food imports
in response to the crop failure, though the main effect of the latter on
food imports was felt the following year.
GNP growth was modest durin R the two years following 1980, despite
a sherp recovery of agricultural output, sveragi_R less than si_ per cent
per annum, compared to more than I0 per cent bet_.e, 1972 and 1979. Thi_
was due in part to the world recession, hut als0 in parL tO stabilization
measures taken i,n consultation with the International Monetary Fund and
Ouppo'lt'ted by Fund stand-by a_ranseme.nts. Gross investment in real te,'ms
was kept well below the peak levels of 1978 and 1979 and the r_te of
inflati_rn was brought down to about eight per cent in 1982 fzom its peak
in 1980 when crop failure, rise in energy prices and devalt_at ion bed
combined to help produce a 26 per ¢_ent rise in the GDP deflsto,-. "_e
stabilization measures helped to maintain growin B export volu_ne in the
face of declining world tr_e, as well _ to li,._it the growth of
imports, which together with some help from the terms of trade, brought
a substantial reduction in the curr:ent- account deficit in ]982.
The role of oil obviously deserves special mention in a discussion
og the balance of payments crises in the 1970's, The. main inpacton •
the 'current accmmt balance was. of course, through the sharp rise in
the import price. Iu 1974 this _a8 more than three and one-half times
and in 1975. more than fo_t and o_e-balg tlmes, the 1971-73 ayerase.
The value of oil _ports es a proportion of total comodity ilports rose
from less than eisht per cent lu 1971-73 to more than I5 per cent
t976 end 19 per cent in 197S.
There is little evidence in the period of the first crisis of any
datet_t_atton to conserve energy or to linit imports of oil by substituting
alr_rnative energy so_rces (Ynger, 1983). While consumption of oil _nd
coal (in tons) were roushly equal in 1972, during 1974-75 cousumpt£on of
coal was Onlysix per cent Kreater than otl, despite the sharp chanse in
relative prices; end by 1978 ot2 consumption exceeded coal coneuspt_o_
by 23 per cent. The r$se in cotai _nerKy use of 8.2 per cent pec annum
dur£nK 1973-79 almost matched the 9.5 per cent rate Of CDP f_rowth, in
contrast to Japan, for example, where the energy use rate of 8rovth was
only about ooe-thlrd that of GI)P (YaKer, 1983). Moreover, the use o£
oil _creased at an annual rate of 9.8 per ce_t over the same period.
EnerSy prices ware allo_ed to increase iu Korea to 56 per cent and
63 per cent over 1973_ respectively, for 1974 end 1975; and this led to a
Slight overall de_line in ener_ intensity (ratio of energy use to GDP) ae
the decline in intensities _n non-i_dustrial _ectors wre than starched the
rise in the industrial sector. Finally, hotmv_r, dependance on imports of
energy (incJ.ud_ng coal, bur excluding uranLLun) ro_e _rom 55 per cent of
total energy supply in 1973 to 70 per cent _n Iq79 (Y_ger, 1983).
In the second crisis, the import price of oil was up elmo.qt
150 per cent and 200 per cent, respectively, in 1980 and 1981 over t.he
average of 1976-78. The value of oil imports was more than 30 percent
of total commodity imports compared to less than 20 per cent during
1976-78.
The rapid rise in oil import: volume finally subsided alter 1979,
partly due to the 1980 downturn in GNP, but due also to _mbstitutitrn of
coal. Coal imports and cot_sumptioa j_tmped sharply i_ 1979 and cot_tintted
to rise at a substantial rote the following two years. Overall, ho_c_vcr,
there is no evidenc_ of energy conservation, as energy _nteneity
:increased 5.3 per cent and 7.6 per cent, respectively, in 1979 and I')8(.)
(Yager, 1983).
Comparing the t_o crises, the fir._t _as _harp and short-lived.
Korea appare.ntl:_largely ignored its balance of payments and opted ft_r
coatlnued export:-led growth; and it worked, leaving its external debt
posigion none the worse for the wear. The second crisis was prolonged
and was compounded by the internal shock of 1978, the over-commj_rm_.nt
to investment in heavy industry and the agrlculturai disaster of 19g0.
As a result, t_heb._lance of payment._ could not be £gnored ,andKorea
began to take measures to dampen the rate of inf1_tion, reduce the
emphasis on heax_ industry, liberate market forces, a_ we_l as to aim
at more modest growth target_ (Republic of Korea, 1982).
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•• Turning to the Philippines, the rtse in the current account deficit
in the first crisis van retarded because o£ the favorable effect on export
earnings o£ high sugar and copper prices in 1974. MoreOVer the deficit
as 8 percentage of trade in the peak year, 1976. yes mmaller than that
.. of Korea tn 1974 and 1975. (See Table 2.) Reserves dropped £n 1975,.but
re_overed l_ 1976 when, as a percentage of trade, they were almost as high
me st the end of 1973, a year in which the PhiZlppine li_d a 8ubBtantlal
curre=t account,surplus. The counterpart to this was, of course, s sharp
rise _ extet_aZ'£ndebtedness, •both. absolutely and as a percentage of trade,
The Phtli_l._.#_ ,_ke._r^r_a. chose to l_nore the ).,'ia......_ _-_-mem
_d opt for .Sr.ovth_. Investment in rural infrastructure to improve agrl-
cultural production and pro_otlo_ of new exports were to iuprove the
balance of payments, vhile government deficits were to provide the stimulus
to aggregate demand to offset lagging demand for tradttic_el exports.
Despite some success in both agriculture and no_-tradltlo_al exports,
ho_m_, the strategy did not succeed. FoIloving a slight :Luprov_nt
in the current account deficit in 1977, it worsened again in 1978.
Reserves in 1977-78 wets at a low point in proportion to trade and
indebtedness grey rapidly to exceed the ratio to trade that prevailed.
in 1971-73. Hence. the Philippines faced the onslaught of the eec(md
o11 8hock _rlthout tmVlag recovered-from the balance of payments crisis
4n£t:lat:ed by the first.
With the oil price iucreases in 1979-80 and the ensuing slowdown
•in growth of vorld trade.*the Philippines' current account deficit
worsened further, creepingup from 21 per cent of trade in 1978 to
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23.5 p_r cent in 198l. Tnternatio_al r_._erve.q declined a_ a pe-r_-entage
of ¢lr_dP from almost 34 per c,..'nt to bp.low 28 per cent ox_r r.he _a_. "
- period, _£1e indebtedness grew only slightly less tha_ _rade. The.
_erease in indebtedness me, have been greater, ho_ever,_.han Tabl_ 2
indicates, _ince the figures _re from the World Bank Debt Tableg which
fall short • of capturing fully privste o_n-_uarm_eed-debt ThL_ "is
more of a problem in a_talyzitag the debt _{tt_tion oT the. Phil. ippi_ms
than chat of Kore_, _ince a much great_r, prc_por_o_ of-the' 1.a,_r'_
debt is p1_bJic or g_mranteed. The figures t[or the Ph:il,,ppino.-:,m_y _,,'c_,_.
at best as a rough i.dex of changes, though I s.spect _ha_ ._be i_creasc
after 1978 is _,mder_ta_ed.
In any case, th_ real _',r;mchcam "in 1.982zn exper_,,_dr<_pp_d m,.;r,e
r_han 15 per cen_ belo_ !981- C_vernment deficit spen¢i_k_ pr,:_ided e,_o_,b
_° _of _ offset to permit _ modest of growth of 2.8 per cent in ....N_, tb_
IoweS_ s_mce the [q60_s. ]mpcrts [, dollars declined four p,'*.rcenr_
.%
tar short of t._e decline in exports. _ut th_s _m the res,,|t'of an
increase i, v_l_ue, more thzn offset by s decli, e _n _port prices.
Likewise, the volume of c,_r_d_ty e×por£s rose a r_gdest five per cenC,
while the e_port uni£ value .index declined 17 _erceat.
The result of this disaster for _be Phili_pine_ •wa._ _ _urre, t
account deficit almost 35 per cent the valise Of t_rade, _a d_cl_ne in
_ntet_tional reserves to 26 per cent of trade, the lowegt sluice 197I,
and a record external indebtedness at 12.%per cent of trade. This
represents a startling contrast to the situation in Kore_ in [98_
which, by _tself, might have appeared bleak enough.
Tt _otHd he _lnfair to i_,nore the rnle of the t_.rm_ of trade on the
fortune,_ of the Ph[l.ippines, Few countries in. the world have. suffered
a._'tcdch from the movevAents of internation_i pr/ce_. With ]971-73 = lO0,
the index for the Phil.'ipp_nes in 198Z was 52, The corresponding 1982
index [or Korea, for example, wn._ 75, OF. course, _ have long known
that the way to avotd ter_s of trade d Csaste?_ i_ to have a built-in
flexibility _o teat resources can move out of reIat-ively declin:ing
price industries The Philippines' continued excessive dependence-on
itr_ tradition,_l exports, a' re:,'_,llt of its own inward-looking indtmtr,ia.1
and tr._de poJ.icies, is as tm_ch to blame for its te._ns of reade losses as
bad luck.
Finally, #_ hr'.el conraent on the rolo of oil. The import pr{ce of
oil in 1974-75 was r_,re than fo,=_ times that of 1971-73, ,_hile the value
of oil import;,_ w_.q 70 per cent greater as a proportion of totaJ cc_odit_
imports, The latter rose to 23 per cent in 1_}76-78 _ich was 87 p_r (:ellt
over 1971-73.
Then, in ti_e.,qecond shock, i,mport price_ ro._e 50 per cent in 1979
and 150 per cent in lqRO-_H t_ver the level of 1976-78. The share Of
oil £rapo_ts rose to 30 per cent of total import_ by 198I as compared
to 12 per cent in 1971773 , 8rid then subsided to 26 per co,nt in 1982.
The Philippines appears to have taken m_ch more seriously than
Korea the problem of energy cost. .Through a vnriety of programs
promoting alternative energy, sources, includin_ hydro, geo-tbermal, coal
and othc_rs, the Philippines managed to limit growth o£ oil consumpti.on
- tO ....
to seven per cent over t.ho (_ntire period 1971.-73 to 1981, and o._.i
imp_,rr,q co a four imr ce.nr increase, This represent_ annuol i.ncreases
of three-fourth,,; o_ one l:er cent and one-hell of one per cent, respectively.
Much of th_._"mjbsti.Lut:ion has occurred very recently, In 1977 oi_l
represented 94.7 per ,_ent_ o_ energy sout:ees, with hydr_ and coal providing
4.3 and I 0 per cent, respectively; By 1982, oil*s snare wa_ doe, to
77.5 per cent, hy;|Fo i,a_ 7 ./4 per cent, geo-the_ma.1 hacl ?.O per e,.nt, coal
hild l 2 $_Ir Ce.._ICon_i ,m_x-,<:onventional_ the remaining O,7 pet ce,_t.
Not onl:¢ has there been sttbStantial s%tbst'<tutxot_ for oil, _)ut the
energy i_tens_£y of t.i_eeco,no,_y has diminishe4. The ratio Of energy ttf4e
tO f_P b_s decl'_nm3, almost _.5 per cent between 1973 and 19S_ (M_kasiar,._'J,q'}).
_._i._;<s ST'It_g],it_l_t" .%t' i)ri_'_,htrtess:in the Phi]ippine p:iCtUr_.
2. S;¢):'k-Ac ¢otr_mod.__iOs Amllysis.
F,._rF.her_;_)d_._t;,tancti._'_._,,)f' _he nat_re ancl ('.oo._eq_sencesof tile balance
,_" pav,_._rs cyis_t_ of .[974-'17 and ]919-82 can be 4er'i_d fr_ . .heek-
accommodation model, eim_'j.ar to that: of Bala.gs_ (1980). _.,e mO_,,l _,S
pr-esent,!d form;_]]v in A_:pendxx A t.o th_s paper; hence, a brief, in|Tnrma]
presentaf:icn alay suf'f_ce he_'o.
The mculel i:_ de._._gn_:_dto _ea.%ure t_i,:.e_;_ _..eX_ernal shocks @!_
....... _ .. ,. . - ......... _ 0., l:ez_s of
trade effec_ and e,x_r_.?.__t_d the ]._tter. int- export share
effect, import _._avjng tLr_,u_:h :;lowe_ growth, ,_nd :import subsL/tution
(World Bank, 198].), The _,erms of lrade effect measures th,, effect on
the commodity _:rade balai_ce of the difference_ _.n import and export prices
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FXnally Impozt substitution seaourep the diffetence beCvoeu actual
i_o and hypothetic81 Inpo_to. Yt attempts to eneumr fbe queet4en:
to what extent mrze imports helo_ the tze_d level by an smmmt beyomd that
eeu/d be tc_o_ted fez by 810_e_ 8ro_h?
The Sap be_tn eoeal shocks _d tom sdJue_cs __ abe
4Md£tAonll ez_ fluanclng requ£rod above the trend value ef 8oak
ftzumetag, as glv_ by the trend valuee of exports ,and i_tm,, Xt ie
m "ac¢_tlo_" to the shocks, _8 are a11 of the abov_ adjustS;
but, unlike the Wozld _SsaMmodel (Wo_Id Bauk, 1981), X _ _mem; tO
separate it _tow the other e_maents o_ ace_B0datlo_o This Is uot 4
submtlnt£_e laeue, of eouree, but merely a rotter of _sBte.
The actual values of the paz_teter8 use_ in the _leu_st_ _erU:
per A_an $,g S,9
Growth _te of
wo_Id exports
Per Annum
O_ Gro_h Rate 9.6 5.3
_o_t Sba_e ,427 .30_
1spot t. E_tlci_y 1.9 1.2
A11 tzade va2ues al'e in p_:_ee.oJ_ _ho..base pe_iod, 19'71-73. Att81ysta
is done £e_ the whole period, 1974-82, and f:o_ the ewe s_b-pe_ds, 1974-77
and 1979-82, For the lat_e_, the baee pe_t_xt is 1976-78. S'i_ce _m have .
_o price indexes for "invisible" _ade, eapo_ta end £upo_a a_e eOumodltle_
• .
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only. In _.ffett, It" is as_d that price e£fects fZou i_vis.sLb'le i.mporcs
ar_i agport_ cancel and thai these cowponemtS of trade are slays at thei_
trend values,
Tvo yards of caution are in order, before proceeding to the reault_
of the aoalyais. First, this _el is tailored to tb_ experience of the
1970'2 and th_ assumption that balmace of psymente tri_s cremate from
exte_l shocks. IL is obvious, hca_nm_, that shocks can be of interns}
origin, as-wet1. I have already noced above _hat 1978 and 1980 could
be eonsidered years of internal shock, fo_ Korea because o.f the Investment
boom in the four yea_ sad the crop fsiture in the _azter. The effects
of these inter_al Shoc_s, however, are t_vealed in the wodel i_ the form
of adjustments. ._ec,_d, _he adj,stmute:sre so_e.t/mes interpreted as
policy responses to t_e sbocks, They nmy_be in some eases. They may
also be in res_nse co _tl_li ot_er t_an government pol£cy. And, even
if _hey are influeuced by gove_e_t polic,les, £hose policies may nnt
be directe_ at the balance of paym_nt_ -- i.e., they may be in re+_pon_e
to sosetht:a_ other than.the shoc_q. These liaitatio_s are in mJdition
_:o those from the asm_ptions of given cons£nnt sh_tres, given constant
elasticities, and. g_v_u graph tre_ds. The res_l_s, then, must be
interpt_¢ed with great cats. gewertheless, even _ith these. L_umitat_e_ns,
the analysis _e_s considerable light on the bala_ce of payments crisis
experience oE Kocea and the l_¢li_imes over the pa:_t decade. To
particulaz I th_k that it highlights _he contrast between the adjustments
Of t|W t_O countries.
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Table_; 3 and 4 _eve_]. the results of the calc_tl.._tionsof ._hecv:sand
ae._.o_mnod.ationsfor Korea and the Pbi.li_pJ.nes, reApectlvely° Results are
_ve_ f'ore._•chyear end s_ammed for the _$nolt:perlod and the two _,_b-_eriods.
Tables 5 and 6 help to p,r_',these res_Its in perspective, by i_dicati_ the
tel.alive -{mportsnce of eac.h _hock arid adjustment to their, respective
toCal._, _s _tl a_ ro trade and GNP.
Total _hocks iu re!.atiot_ to-CNP were slightly more i.mpnrc_mt _o
Korea than to the Philippines, chile.,in re].atio_ to trade they were. _JchJ
_ore important to Clte latter co_mtry (Table 5), The revers,_t, of cour_'_ _,
re,let.is the fact that trade ms a proportion to CNP is much larger fox
Korea, ;._ver'_.JF£ng_.2 per cer_c over t.hewhole period co_)szed tr}22. per cent.
for the Phi.li_pp_.,er,._ut the p_cture is nonetheless surprising. On_
_J._ht exp_:ct e_ternal shocks e.man_tiRg from change._ in the prices _id
volume ¢_fwor_d trade to be more u_form berveen eoun1:.rle_i_ re;.ation
to trade th_t_ co (,NPwh_.,,tr_d_-(_ _ ratio_ differ ._harpiy. This 'isthe.
same &:hi_g ,s sayin_ we wouJd expect the mole trading ¢¢_t,n'try to _e mo¥'_.
v_lnerable _o _#ttchshrieks then _he 1¢._ trading co_._:try,_her_we mes_ure
damag_ :iv tel.ate.onto CNP, _[_ [_zrns out not to be true Ln ti_s c:tse,
howeve,r, 1"he ratios are muc-h more. nearly uniform for C_qP _:_tn for
trade_ indicati_ roughi._,equal vulnerability .:iespitethe 17m:t that
i(orea',_tr_de-.CNP ratio is _Imo.,._tdouble that of the Philxppi_tes.
_,_: fac_: th,_Z:total _horEs represe_ a t_uch _,',.,xgherproport'i.ovLo 1_
'¢.radelot the Phillppi.¢_e_ is l_rRel•Y expJ8:_ned hy the differences in
_he behave.or _f the two countries' ter_s of _r_de, a diffete._tcea.tready
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note_ above. 1_e decline in Philippines v terms of trade over the period
1.9"II-73to 1982.of 48 per cent was a].most do,ble that of Korea. 'fhi._
undoubtedly reflects the Philippines' greater, dependence on primary
. e_port ,.
In any case., the ter_ of crmde effect predominated oyez export vo.[ut_e
for both cotmtries over the whole period, as well as in each slab-p_r:[od-
Mbreover, for both couatries, total shocks w_re semewh_.t 8rearer in
relation to rT:aOe in the fir_-tperiod than in the seco, d, tho,,gh the
diffecence is trot:great. The period ends in 1982, however, so that t.ii_
addit.lonnl f_hock of 19S3 is not co_mted. No doubt if we added one yea_
.to each period tl_ picture would be reversed.
The pattern of exT_ort vohoe shocks is, o£ c_rse, exactly simil_r
for Lh_ c_o ¢:ountr[es, be.ing derived (rom the sa_e world expor.t v,_lues
and c.on,=tamte_port shares. Com_rin_ the two peri.od_, _he _ffec£ i,_
m_ch greater i_ tl,eseco_)d, refl.ecti_8 the greater depth ,nd lert_th of
the wo_rld _ecemsion.
The pat.terns of ac<ommodations, J.n contr.ast to the shocks, show very
!j.rtle similarity. _%_le the shocks wete..largely accommodated hy a(idi.t.'!=o_
to red,,ce external finmvzing _:.lrbe].ow the assum_4__._9/_. Over the wh,:_le
p_.riod Korea's trade a_d growth ,ld_u._tmenr.s were .tore than double the
estimated o.ffe_t:Sof _he shocks. For- the Philippine.f; thence adiustme.n.':_
representod less th.,t one,-f_ur."ho_ :itsshocks, le.av.in__or#) Khan
• " , % '75 per cent to be :m_.thV add:,t1_.n;)_,fit_.anc-ln_l._yond tbe ass_ed trend.
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Q
,o._ly ,t_t_r b.=,,m e_, m, _o.
over r_s t_oZa t_r_-oa, /a¢_ .=port _m ,ms, uot __tY.
cite tin:jOt ,4jW___fm¢ I_s _Mtfueii for 59 pe_-"et_!'ef_!_i,_.
_u==. _y ,..__ ".,¢ood__. '__,¢_ .m=tl,_. ,,mm,_=_,,
8m.ch_' ha_e _=s'eo=¢=_b_¢i__.s =t,e_. ' "
_Xa8 uo_ Co a ccmpsrt_On of =he seeemmd=t:tea_tlt__,_:_'_s,
_X"-t_ cue*_,e for _, se=_d period _.s1976-n; i__izsmtl,_ :v=zuu
for t_e se_:_, Ip.e_'i6d,repre_c::edd£tioaa_t shocl_.dttd =__t_it;_mmr
' dit6¢_b.ue c=_her, chart acc_su_ed • wluu over 1771-73,-80"._h _ _lu_e,
U_eeoU_d already =h_¢ cl_ PhitipptaeS _juaced betM _.',_:Jd_-_d_l_d
mt,=i_=o¢.op¢.iZomr=_r, =!.=to,,,,t._¢t_.-,,mml_=
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policies. It i8 true chat growth was well below trend value in the
recovery after 1980. at about six per cent compared to the assumed
trend of 9.6 per cent. Nevertheless, without the crop £ailure, F_res'8
p@rfor_e ratio -- adJuat_ute co shocks -- would have been
conmidar&bly lower in the second period than in the first;
For both countries, the _aporcanca of export share adjustment to
exports was greater than that of import substitution to /reports. though
the Philippinam J_provement occurred only £n the _econd period (Table 6).
The significance of the Philippines' export market share performance Is
better Lndkcated, however, by the value for export share in the final
year (Table 2) divided by the total increase In exports over the period.
This gives the proportion of export gain that is due to greater nutrket share,
and is ¢ho_ in the second coluam of Table 6. For the whole period the
proportlcm was 72 per cent _nd for 1979-82, a ruutrkeble 95 per cent.
This shove £n the second per_od the continued growth of Phillpplne exports
in the face of declJ.n_ng _rld trade (both measured in 1972 prices).
Korea's perforeumce in thls respect yea even more outstanding. The
proportions of _cport gain accQunCed for by Increased share were 92 and
96 per cent, respectively, for the decade and for the last four years.
One cannot easily srKue, in the case of Korea, hc_ever, that this drive
for increased exp_rt share was a response to the shocks of the [970's.
Rather, it had been going on for some time previously. If, for exanpie.
I had calculated hypothetical e_-ports on the asmmption not of a constaut
base period share, but had insr_ead projected the past rate of increase of
- 18 -
[orate sha;,_t (ov,_" the period. 1961-63 Co 1971-73), Korea _
h_ s subetmtis_ a-eaciw uporr share _j_Umnt. Xor,mm_, Zeus's
hypothetical exports In 1982 would b_v_ reputed rc_bl_ half Of
_r2d mxpotte. _u face, of couz_, the rstm of in©tesam isL Eot_'8
share retarded mmr the &scads end, s in 1982. MevQcth41eeo, it u_s,
81moat three times the base period (1971-73) share; mad ch£, lare,Jly
sr.cOu_tm for the outs,r.4md_n8 adjustment pmrfm-mmce in, Che ahock-
amcamscdsr.ion _i.
1_a o_r_ll results lmtKely corrobotst_ Korea°8 far aL1_erlor
balsam of psyJmat,s s_usment _t yes evtddmc in the a_dLyeLe o_ the
first •section. " They show also ch_ preoffence of the terms ot .trade
_ct _ the _h p_te. _ septic}, of _i1_ 8hock _or _ _t2£ppt_s,
_sm_lts-f©t Ko_a _shc seem _o e_lleet hup l_s_mc_, of
peyne_ts surpluses by _. e_dof the d_c_,dm, w_leh _te not in evideuca.
Th_ p_incipal r_ i_, _s _oced sbov_, the co, scant eha_ assumption
in tea czl_ulatio_ of hypod_ieaX aud t_ m_pO_te. A eecood _so_
is the _cIin_ in r_ iucame eluticic_ of import demmnd f_ojt 1.9. the
us_m_d Cremd level, to le_s gha_ 1.6. _aaC th_ mules shc_ t_ Utat
b9 t_c_i_4.1_8 _ort ml-,_._et_dly s_d reduce, ice isport elastie_cy.
.V_res svoid_ _l_t umsld ke_e be_, other cl_4-p mqual, m d_ete_,
" Tog _k_ Philippit_s, Ch_ better ptrformsa_ In the ev_ond period
_lll_t _ Co. C(m_liCC With the bs/.ancqt of I_tymmt8 C_mi8 indic_tot_s,
_i_ imlieat_d a much _o_ oeriou_ aitu_tio_ in 197g-82. The t'_g_r
t'emulta, hmmveg_ eho_chm ch_utge from 1976-78, _h_ie thinlmtter eh_e
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the •_eemsl_ s_e_ 197z-73. _ I_14#_iShts the /aqortmce of thb
fiat th_ tits .PhllipplMo had f_14d to recover .£x_m ths first' olu_ek.
befe_ en_o__ ,the. secend in. explstn/aS its pre, lmt prsd/_t.
po_ boe_ eoeseries, hnewr, tb_..s_x.Ts_s so fsr shoreS.,lltt_
•of _s-_dsce_"e-_fo_t to. x_lWoe4,t_, the .ba_mce of.,pSyum_s
sboeb ss such. _.cher. £t appesrs _h8¢ each we incmt ol 8z_mh ,s_d
_,st"/_ is _,LtX/mS:to borrw abroad v_m Usaeess_ W ss/au ._ _h.
1_is/mmqm,_s_/m_ =sks, mmmm, x _d_k. e_sa _estLn8 _b8 export
Imrf_ ms L, _,eponse to r_e slWelm. _r _h, l_/_pLus it d£d
uot su_Ud; Bsspi_, sores s_cas_ /_ efforts co prouo,t_ eev escorts.
To shsd mm_s _ o,_ the ws_/_l_._y o_ t_, hyparJmsis _hat be_
_m(;r/ms, wze laSZ's_L_ $_outh Sr._rar.sSlss, lStDs_Y /4_z_,S ba_c, of
ps3_SntS coxidetat/mts, £C _ht be £ns£r_t£w to 1_ok ,brLefl_ in the
nat soetioa _t ths£t /n_st_nt and ssvln8 perfotusnce_durinS t_
_.s_.
3. Savins-I_s_snt ku_,_.
• The ratloe of I[_ss _r=mnt mini irroes _s_ ¢o _ are shenm
Ln Tab_e_ 7 an4 8. t_Spect£vely _ot Korea a_d th_ _hilippied_, fo_ the
yem_o 1971-82. Tha _at/_s are s/sLtlaZ sad relatively high c_psrsdto
&_topi_S cQuntrLe, in 8sur_ and a1_o to th, ._,_.£os fo_ tlm sam
eount_/as /a the 1960's.
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_e dA_e_e_.e be_eu r_e t,m t_tlee la, of cream, fere_l_eav_,
,_e_ tae_mlu nat tremfan, as wA1 as mt e_ I_.
]Latter e_i_y 4_ foreisn eavini fer beth eoI_r_. _. so
=hat _ cmqmsmt of sev_8 ees m as _ _ _,_ _
immem_.
_st is mtrik_U_8 in beth case= is tim =los durta8 the zg;0's ef the
tmestuut z_bm te leusla shove 30 per eat at _ md of _ duads,
t_ 24 per cemt aml 2t pe_ mint, rolp_t£mt27, for Korea end
Pld_ppiae8 la tie bxse pertmi, mhlla _he rat_ dregped off fo_
(of_ in 198t end 1982, a zeeord b_ of 35 pet cemt ta lgTg 8_L_a en
2o_ 197_-82 ef Ju_ elmve 30 pet ee_t Tho __m08 us_tained
a ,u,Qdy ratio over g_e fnt _e_rs of the seeeed sub-pertad at the usa
lm_ )tereovs=. th_ _t_o yes al_dy at 28 per eest for Ir_ta m_d
per _= far die FaiAip_e_ ia _, f_¢ m_rled ?be _I_ per_
ef the tuo smocks has all the e.m_ of _ _r_oemmt 1join fez
emmet_e
_, the Lmmsmm¢ ta¢_ rote i_q_es= dweln8 the peak _ear=
e_ ¢1_ ,_at_e of ee_nmt =¢¢em¢ dd_t¢ r.e trade -- 1_7_-_5 ad 1979-_o
fe_ I[omo rout 1975-76 and 1_79-0= for _ _dAi_es l_e e_de_ce
_.= _e,=t: Xf one did ,tot kae_ abe,=t _ o3.1 et._ a_t ,,_=pl_
st tmmtmat s._ _, bslmce ef _mmts t_stet_, e_ _¢
eesLl_ _ludo Chat tb_ yua_ of _e_e of ps3_euce 4_r_Le_t_Jae _ete
Sd_tly }qJ_rO_ rate imms_s_t boom Sot out of hand. lhtC. of Co.roe
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we must bring in saving to complete the picture of, this side of the
story.
Both countries also raiBed their saving ratios over base. period
levels, i.n the case of Korea by enough to maintain For the period
1974-82 the same percentage gap below the investment ratio an prevalh:,J:
in 1971-73. The Philippines had no gap in the b_se period, but the
rise in saving failed tO tmtch that: of Lnvestment, creating an avera_c
gap of just under six per cent duri, ng 1974-82. This was slightly levy.
than Korea's gap. In both countries, but especially in Korea, the. _:'h_/.'.
in government saving represented a si_alficant contribution (Tab].es 7 :_,_,!_).
Looking again at the peak yearn of the current account defici: _'!,'>_
Korea (1974-75 and 1979-80), _._ find saving relatively low :i.r_the _,_r.
pair of years, which together with the sharp rise in the i_ves_ment
ratio, yields peak values for the foreign saving ratio. In 1979 the
saving ratio was very. high along _Ith the record _nvestment _at£o, bt_r
the former dropped sharply Im, [980 and r_ined below aver, ge for the
next two years. [-tis r,ossible that in 1974-75 and again in 1980 _._,_i_L
was dampened by the consequences Of the external shocks -_-e.._. slo_,-
growth of GNP and higher rates o_ inflation; but there _e0_a[n the
relatively high investmet_t raci_os as clear indicator of internal sh_i,<_!,,
For the Philippines the picture is clea_er. There _s no evide_,:_c
of a decline in the sav_.ng ratio during the peak current deficit ye;r_:_
until _e reach 1982, Indeed, ie the other five years (1975-76 and
]979-81) saving was at or _bove the average for 1974-82. Again, the
high investment ratios remain as evidence of internal sh_ek,
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Oue would need.a very rich model to measure the relative effects
of the external and internal 8hocks on the resource 8_P, All I can
_ay here. I$ .that it eeem_ evident that there w_re Int.¢rnal Investmnt
shocks in both coant_lee colnei.din8 with the external shocks. This
18 besg e_qplmlned_ I thlnk_ by the 8ha_) ri_e in government In_ee_nt
in b_th c_triee in those yesrs_ preeumahly a_ a _c_trn_y,_llcal _easure,
In any _ase_ it is cleer .r,hat both c.ountrle_ WeTe O_t1',nEfor growth
and _re unw_l!:LaK Co lel: belanca of p_ynent_ co_cern_ stand in the w_y
(at leaat _z_tll the e=d of t_m period for Korea), •Korea w_,s, o£ course,
more successful _,_ tbls etrat_, not only i_ e.x_,_n._,_i_g_tm_._poEt _he,re_
"but_n _eneratln@; _z_wth out ,_f _,_vi_. _ _ell. Pb,ii!ppine. _ruwth w._
retarded _,/ an incremental caplta%-_utp_t ratio (ICOn,> that_ rata:[ned
hi_h_ relaxIvy not _nly to Kor_ 'bu_ t_ moet developin_ countrle_, _ing
i_ part et I_88t to dietorti_e I_ government pr_.ce _te_,_e_tlon ..
_ollcleS, Korea_ in c(mtrast, enjoyed a low ICOn, until th_ mcltch t.c_
Inves_ut in heavy, industry in the !at_ _gTO'S,
4. Strategies and Policies.
What the quantitative analysis show_ i_ that: both eountrJe_ p_tt-
growth above halance of payments congid_rat[ons and were willix_ K to
increase external debt in r.he face of severe external shocks to implem_-.n_
this strategy. As noted above, Korea was able to get. away _t.h it, _._,ti._
prematurely Jt went overboard on investments in heavy £nduatrv, ]argq_Iv
because of its export ._hare performance w_th mom_ help from import
__ubstitutEon. (_e slower growth el_ment shou]_d be d:i.scol.mted becm_
it reflects the crop failure i.n 1980 and the year._ 1981--82 when Korea,
was no longer 8ettlng away with it.) While the Philippines had modes,+.
success in both export share and import s_bstitution (its import o].a_tic-ity
dropped to below 0.9 eo,_pared to the assumed va/._e of }.2). those
adjustments fell far short Of what was needed to mJs_n its faster
growth strategy in the world economic env_.ro,lment of the 197't's. That
m_ch is clear. The big question, of cmJrse, is why Korean [;erfo_;m_,,-'__
was adequate to the strategy choice and the Phi]i.ppi,es' p_rl!or_nce _,:_
not. It is not the purpose of tb_s paper r,o g_.ve a_ a_swer to _'hi::_q_e_t i_',..
8ow_..%_er.a brief comparison of _.nd_.strini and trade strat_,f.<..,:and p:_I_<;_-
based on studies (e.L_ Westphal ,._u_dKin, and Ba,xr.iata, P,lw_,r n,_,lAm:=._;i.,.::.:"
tha= have been directed to this question, may help to guide ,,_ [a t_4:_
direction of an a_e_.er.
The Philippines has suffered for three decades under hiZhiy
protective and dis_orted industrial and trade p_.liciea theft pro,_.c_'d
stron8 biases against ex_orts and agricultural production in favor of
the wauufacture of consumer _nd s_ inter_dist, goods for the do_t.i_:
market. _e result of this has bee_ to retard the growth of both
manufacturing and agriculture, to hamper efforts to promote _on-traditic-_,_..,.:!.
exports, and to maintain _ excessive decadence o_ _radiv.ica2a.ipr:i_ry
exports. F_curl_nt cycles of ba_nce of ._aymeat$ crise.o, devalustien __,.".
inflation resulted from the inability of the prim_:y sect.or (burdened
by overvaluat.i_ o£ the Peso _d the' cost of go_ez_meut p_i.co tnr.ez_.ntJ._:_"_.
policies) _o carry this load, (_,aterna_=ioualLabour' $_'!fice,}.974)+ $..ttc_apt_,
beginuin.g at the end of the 1960's_ _o counter the bias _inst non-.
traditional exerts by meane of fiscal incenti_$ have been inadeq_m[:e
in the face of _he sUbSt_tial ondarv_satio_- of f_,re£:_ exchange that
:is4efemde_. by _he tariff _ystem. I_ _ 'nO_ t_,_ti!_:heearly 1980's
that reeo_nitio_ of the inade_a.cy of this patch_,on_ pat,,:h-_,spprcseb
to ¢Ou_terinK the biases of _.heprotection system, _-.e6t,_ _:h.£adopt:_.on
Of a program of trade l_bara_i_za£ion and fiscal i_,_ee,n_ives r._._fo_+in
commt_tation with the World Bank and _u__orted b)' _-rt_%_al 8dj_st_enU
loans, imp].e_entatl.on of _his program has been ha_,er_d, however, by
the continuing _or_d _ecess_on and i[s _fects on the p_'ia_s and vo]_m
o_ P_IUppine _xports,
Korea also initially adopted en inward-lc_kin_ s_ra_e_y_ b_t: in
the early 1960_s s_Eched to export promotion. Largely throu_h cheap
eredit fo= export £sdustrles _d exchange rate polic_, sided by tarif_i
llberali_tion :.£r_1967 a,_d i973, Korea was able to creat_ a more balanc,eJ
set of incentives for e_ports and i._port substitution.
Zn the s_d-1970's, because of £ncreas/_g protectionism in
industrialized country uatkets end Srovlng competition in /abor-lntensive
manu£actures, goremn strateay sb-ltched to /aport substitution in heavy
and chealcs1"£adustrlea. Over the 1970's, various fiscal incentives
for exports wre retired and fi_slly eliminated, _hile being increased
for thm nov capital-Intensive industries. By the end of the decade all
that rs_a/_M for export8 was the preferential interest rate.
F£_lly, in =ha early 1980's .trataS_ w_ assin re_rsed and Ko_
adopted of program aimed at more modest Sro_h end a coucouitanC
zadoct/mz of inflation, lees emphasis on heavy industry, trade as4
starker liberalizatiout and more attentim to the rural and otheg
neglected sectors. The prosrsm is supported by stand-by err_nts
vi_h the l_ad (Korea's first use of Fund resources since 196|) and by
s World Bank stz_ctural sdjust_nt loan. The program has _ir_ady had
some success in helplng to bring down inflation and the c_-rant account
deficit, uhJ_e sustaining g_ow_ of _P at six per cen_ £n the face o£
d_cl£u£ug expozts (International _onetary Fund).
Prom this overview of lonK-rsnga strategias and policies, I turin
nOw to pollc£es _h_t _re related _ora i_diataly _o _he balance o_
psya_nts crises. Pirst and foist, the policy response to the
external shocks in both countries vas to boz¢ov _ll_, _ile
vigorously pushing ahead with growth, as already noted.
The other _x_t_nt aI_nt of iautedia_e polleies va_ tl_ --_8e_.
of the price of foraisn exch_e. Table 9 sb_ nouina_ sud real excha_,_
rates for the won and the peso for the years, 1971-82. _eal rates
ideally should be nominal rates adjusted for changes in the relative
prices of internationally traded goods and non-traded goods. And,
since non-traded goods can be decomposed into traded _d pr_ _ry faetor_,
ve really would like to have an index of primary factor pric-._. (Thi_
assumes that changes in the degree of protection are not important, _'-i=h
was true for the Fhilippinesp but perhaps not for Korea.) For the vrice_
of traded goods I have ,_sed _radL_ unit values -- the simple av_.rm_,eof
import and export unit values. ;'ornon-traded goods (or primary factors)
I ha,,e used the GDP deflator, it being the index tha_ most 6Ully inel_i_es
non-traded @oods and services.
The Philippines began the de,ado wi_h a devaluation a,14 the adoption
Of a managed floating rate policy. The nominal rate rose gr_sdually to
1976 and then leveled off to the end of _he decade. T%e r,al rate rose
im 1974 es a reflection o_ high oil prices on the import side and high
susar and )pper prices on _he outpu_ side. It then _el] during the
balance og _aymenta crisis years ([975-76), reflecting @=_,_tic infla_ior_.
After 1976 i_ remained roughly constan_ at about the bsse period fennel,
The_e is virtually no evidence bore of _n exchange Fate policy respons_
tO the balauo; Of payments c_ises. Not ,mill 1982 di_ the peso depre¢:i.:_._
slsnificanely ._nd this was not enough to raise the real rate,
I_ contrast, there is some evidence of exch_n_ rate response i._
_he Koreasa case. Significant depreciation took p; ace in 1975 m_d lq_0-._i,
in each case loll'wins by one year the onset of _he crisis. These _ere
not enough, however, to k_.ep _he _eal. r_:e f.rom falling, owiug to _a_
rates o_domestic inflation. A_ the constant nominal rate over
1975-79 allowed _he real ra_e t_ fall ,i_ificantly below the base
_iod level.
_t conclusions can w_ d_ fro_ this brief look nt s_rategie_ _=,:<-,:!:
pOlicies? First, the iJmedlate p¢1_icy rempons_ to the balance of psW<_ o:.
e_s vere similar in the t_ cases, ,_xcep_ for gorea_s m_dest _xch,_.__;:
•ate adjustments. 'l_e name of the ga_ _wasbor__;o_abx'o_d,
Whyp then, _s Korea's "_fer'_nce _o _:'_ b_tter? T_s g_eat
differance lles in the long-_ _tratsgie_ aad _olicies, n__ i_!_the -
£._ed_Jlte _-eaponses. Zorea_e ¢_t_ard~iookiag constellation o_ treble
and _d_trt_l. policies e_ apl_rently _ ga'_ it a grea_ advantage:
over the _hilippines, who_ _trkec p_ice di_c,'_r_:ious f.ro_ _.ts own tra:..-!._..
and im_u_trial policie_ not ¢m_y _m_red _he gro*_th of non-.craditic_i_
exports_ but also underrated Che efficiency o_ trm_slaCi.ng a, high lev_:C
of inv_St_-nt inco growth,
The outl_ok for developing ¢_ountrfes in general is nc,t very brig.:."
Crowth in. the industrialized countries is expected to be slower ir_ _!:: ,:
than in _ past two decades, particularly in Europe _nd Japan. Mor._:ov,:..'_
there i.s a_ yet no indicat_on that they ,_i.llopen their economies m_e.
fully _o isports fro_ developing countries° _wo strstegies are ca]l__
for in the fsce of this prospect. Or_.eis to promote diversification; _:,•[!
th_-.r_•ralsector t,h_:ough.._edium_•d•s_l sea.la industrial enterpri._e_.•
The other .isto•promote _ore trada _ong developing countries (the i_:[
dev_.loped _eg_t of wo.:ld trade), There is no reason why the gre_t:___
of cou:_=ries like Kore# a_d the Philippines _hould be rigidly tied t,'_
growth i¢_ _he _nd_st'ria_.ized countries.
Both coun.trie_._21th.i_k_ are fully aw_.re ,_..__he need to move ._
these dira¢•tions. _)r_ i•m_or=a•nt,both are aware of pa_t. mistakes _q_
oa that_ew dire.<:.tlc_sindicated in Korea'c Fiftl_ Five Year Plan a_d t".._e
Phi].Ip_i_es _ trade iib_r_lization and ether refo_s u'_der its _:_truc_.v__.._,
adj us t_.n't 9rogra_,
How _uch _uccees car_we expect _rom t:hez._e,_._._-_ort_?For E.or_a. -",'.
_rospects ._re reasonably Bood __t the}-will _:_.eable to _ch.ie":_es,_,?'. " '.
near at l_as, the gr_;_h, s,.abiltzat_cr_ _nd dii.ve_._ificarior_,targetg
their Pla_. _a¢t_ deperJ_ of ae_,rse._en the _orld eco_,_omf_:envi-ce_.._.:•._
For. th_ Ph'i,lippi_,_.:, 'the picture is trot: _o b:,:iRh_. The pol'i:.i'_"_'-!,..
even_ be_i=_i_ in A_st, 1983 r_.vea.ie.dh_w f_agile _be, Fh_i_-_,_-
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bL1ance of paym_ts and dabt ,It_mtloa _a. the sppar_t lag in th_
ability of th_ gove_t ev_ to reco_Ize. let alone te d@al with_ _:_,_
pollt£c_ crisls, hss /_duc_i 8 ._sslve capital fi_ht that has sev_":,_
d_ed thin Phillppi_e econ.. _;_, how_ve_ thin polltlc_l cri_s c_,_.
be resolved soon, the eco_ _ill re_ove_, ,though it will t_ke t_ _,_
qaln, a £avorable world _vlr_t. The _nderlyr_n_ eco_c_c _cu_c,_'_,
is not: wssk and was l_r_S rapidly _ tll_ fii_s_ h_l_ o_' 1983., A _,_:_:_.:.,_,,<_:
d_m_ i_ however, that:th.._:_mol,_slr_of the _olltlcsl cr_.ei_ml,S_-_t
mama l_ss com_i_m_mt t:o ths ecr.m_ctc policy re_oc_ to _hi¢_ the p'zss.,_:._:.
,r_)_ ha( c_tt_ itself.
- %0-
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Appendix A. The Shock-Accoimodation ModelII
The resource pp (R) in the base period is eq_uml to cc_n_ity impor:.#
l_sm commodity exports (X) less net earnings from _rv_ces and privat_
trsnsfers (S).
c_> "o""o-_o-So
The resource SaP in any a_bgequenc period (n) equal_ imports in b_e.
period prices raised or lowered by the ch_mge in _mpol:t prices less ex_,orr.,-:.
_J_ base period prices raised or low.red by the ¢_tmge Ln ewpozt prices i_,._
the $ balance iu current prices.
(z) R. -,_ (I + r" xon) - Xn (t.+ Pc,a)- Sn
We can then divide the change in R bet'ween the two perioda into _.
terms of trade effect and s volume effect.
(3> %:,%-_,,_,-_,,o_>+( -.o>-<x-L>- (s.-so)
We then define Rn-Rn£ as ¢he_ additional external fi_ancing zequi_'e4
in period u, where Rt is _,he t_end resource pp_
o%on- c_-.o>*(x,,-Xo>+(_,.-So)
the _m ,S is always a_ its _rend value.)
Rem¢
--X/Thei

rices for CNP and world exports are the annual a
I the period, "1964 _'t "1972" _tatiol J_- .... _ _ _ ..........
indicate three year averages a_ >und the )wars. The growth _ate for vorld
exports was calculated to b_ _.9 per cQnc per annum, ]_or Korean CI4P,
9.6 per cent, and for Philippine _, 5.3 per _eent.

._r_.
Koren: InH ,,-. I03 + 1.571 lnY- 1.579 lnP F - 150
(11.32) (-.94> 72 . .974
DU- 1.33
Philippines" lnN* .117  .R83lnY- .312 lap F - 40
(8.610) (-.932) 72 - .908
_oth £ncole eluticities are oigni_icant _t the one per cent
,_elthez_elative prlce elasticity £_ ai_nificant.
196_-s2
Korea, lnt_ = -.066 + 1.646 lnT- ,$84 lnP F = 377
(_t.s_) (-4.o6) -_2..97s
g_ -..72
Philipp/_ee" lnX- .062 + 1.091 ln¥- .441 1rip F - 1_8
(10.18) (-3.37) _2 ...939
- 1.68
All o_ the coef_Ic£ent:s are 8/Snlflcsnt at the one pe_ c_.nt level.
I
TaW '.. Balance of Payments Crisis Indicators:
Korea, 1,971-82
(Millions Of U.,_. dollar_ and Per Cent)
Year Current Accom_ Per cent International Per Cen_ Extern._l Per (:(e_:.:Dei;._.' .:
Balance of Trade 1/ " 2/ of Trade Indebtedness of TrmL:_• Reserves- " ,:.i_-_,..i.,.:
:_,971 --847 39.8 571 26.9 2,505 117,9 _'.':.
C?72 -370 14.8 740 29, 6 3,088 123.7 !:.,:::;,
:::73 -.308 ). l 1,095 25.0 3,927 89.9 : :::,
i774 -2.023 31.2 1,056 16,3 4,849 76,9 _:_
'97_,!_.. -I, 887 27.2 1,550 ' ,,22,3 5,9,57 85.8 .L.
:'; <> -31.2 3.1 2,961 30.2 7,253 74.] 9 ,
_l97 ; 12 - t,, 30"1 32.7: 9,026 6_;.b ':.
_973 -I,085 6.1 4,937 27.6 I_..747 65.5 _c ,
?,9 "."_
..... 4,15t ].9. I 5,708 26.2. 14,304. 65 ,5 >>,;.°_
:_780 -5,321 20. 9 6,5 72 _;. 8 .'6,705 65.6 :t:2. '_
>:-..... -4,645 _5.,5 6,890 23, 1 20,652 6_) 2. "_; ?
:.,,_:,_ -2,650 8.2 6'985 23._ 20;752 _-/ 69.6 :_".
;_,_:,: I971-73 -508 20.6 802 27.2 3, _.73 id..5 _....
,_.>.',:.,_;,197/)-77 -I,052 15.4 2,468 :25.4 6,771 7.5.8 _.0.;
.._;-v._'.;..1979-82 -4,192 t5..9 6,539 26.6 18)103 . 67.6 i.?.;
/v_;'_, I9 74-82 -2,651 t4.6 4,552 25.3 I2,360 70,9 !:.;;.. ;
--l/Trad_ is average of e_rports and imports.
2/End of year.
_/Public debt•plus guaranteed private debt di,_tded by e_ort._..
!/Estim__e based on cYtangein p_blic d_bt
_,,)urce:&si_ P_velopmen_ Bank, _ ladic_tor_)April _d Oetober) 1983.
_ . Balance of Payments Crisis Indicators:
Philippines, 1971-82
(Millions of U.S. dollars and Per Cent)
?ear CuzT_t /_ mat Per cent International Per cent External Per cent Debt: _._,:.
_anc of Trade _1/ Reserves _2/ of Trade Indebtedness of Trade R._ti:_j_:
_/i -3 0.2 376 25,6 1,685 114.7 6._
_9_ 9 - 551 35.7 1,868 120.9 _._:
," : 3 536 - 1,038 43.6 1,918 80.5 :_3.7
:, _'_ -176 4.7 1,504 39.8 2,_I1 61.1 _'_._
J
_,7', -892 23.4 1,360 35.7 2,788 73.3 7.
i_:___ -1,050 25.6 1,642 40,0 3,93h 95.8 7 ,. 1
977 -752 15.9 1,524 32.1 5,103 107.5 7.6
,_7_ -1,173 21.0 1,881 33.7 6,297 112.8 13.2
_':'?? -1,576 22.0 2,4.16 33.8 7,204 100.9 ]3._
)9_:C: -2,051 22.6 3,140 3_. 5 8,415 92.5 7. ,_
_'_.1 -2,293 23.5 2,707 27.7 10,148 !08.8 ]_),_
_8;? -3,3.57 34.6 2,543 26.3 12,138 -_6/ 125.3 _3.2
::'._:_',_1971-73 181 - 655 35.0 1,824 105.4 _;.',
_v_. 1974-77 -717 17.4 1,50"t 36.9 3) 534 81,9 : 7
::v_;. 1979-82 -2,319 25.7 2,701 30.6 9,476 105.6 _L°G
i
_i',vg. 1974-82 -1,480 21.5 "2,079 33.7 6,482 95.9 _. _'
!...... ,-. ..............
1/Trade is average of exports and imports.
2/End of year.
31public debts plus guaranteed private debt divided by exports.
4/Eetimate based on chan_e in public debt.
Source: A_ian Development _ank, Key Indicators, April and October, 1983.
_xte-znai _,'.c-cks and ..... _ ....
- ;_uc.-,_o u a ['_c. _,s. : Korea, 1%.',_.-$2
(_.i " " " U....... . .... :
_'ear Terms of Export Total g_..o_t Sl•-z -- o%'er Impo rt Tot al Addi [iom
Trade Vo!u_ Sho.t'ks _hare Cro_.._th S_,bst,2tution _ A_ust_ ..... ._-._i:
1974 1,754 38 i_792 309 -_16 .555 1,348
!975 2,130 33'J 2,463 i,600 !61 1,024 2,785 -3_-
i'_76 1,962 322 2,284 2 ;700 -351 1,533 3 _918 - ]. ,634
977 I, 161 45D t.,6ii 3_546 o-4!! 1,739 4,874 -3,263
978 l _7_0 57'9 2, "559 4 _2 72 -754 i, 609 5,1.27 _2,768
)79 3,909 676 4,585 4)029 °°355 1,866 5,540 -955
_80. 5,2 _....... 1,036 6°274 &,7_2. 2,247 2,134 9,173 -2,899
_81 5, t_88 i ,399 7,2!}'7 6_219 3,257 2,385 11,861 -4,574
9BZ _,881 1,92! 6,002 6,985 4,609 " 3,392 I&,967 -8,965
971_-P,2 -_.?_9t)3, 6 ;7_/._.= 34,657 34,952 @,4!4 16,227 59,593 -24,q36.
974-77 7,007 i,143 @,150 8,655 -58i 4,851 I2,925 -4,775
)?c_-82 7i2,580 3,232 t5,8t2 8,001 1t,721 3,259 22,981 -7,I69
',"": .:;:: ; 2:'-_...":.:i_.:!.,_._., '"-_.... _ "':":" '7:.to[:'_, '.;i:_.?
2_;':':_.:-;:_'..F. ";:"; ::": "_ .'T-- ' _.._.,..:.-:._ . >4 ...... _ _.',:.. ..-..':.-; c_-.:., :-,_..'_.-._,. _'.._..:.._ --.,.- _q,o:'_-
• • L: c.:..;..:,;:...t. ".-..... : .- _! .' :":.-.2__t!. :.."...:L_:: "--'.-._/". ¢: -":.-.z_2:'.. " ......
_;_.i_:::,a.!Shock_ and Accc,::_nodations.:Philippines, !974-$2
(.miiii_:_sof U,9, doIlars)
Y_ T_-rm_-o_ Exgor t Tot el.. Ex.p.ort Slo_e r I'mpo_U Total: A_i_iena[
Tr_e- Voium_ Shocks $ha_e Growth ShSsti.turion_ Md_.ustmen_s _ina.nainu
I-,9_-7;_' li,D08 Z37- ii,1-%5 -l'Of _7;_' 4_ -I!29. L,3:,
llJ_.%: I_,2_i: 21_7.. I%,h-Te- l,l:ff _i:I0. 11113_ 1.21: I_,35-7
l_TJ; 1:,3h9 _ 31_' II, BS:_ &05: _1:1;5". 258- :i56 1:,,1'3[2
I_TEB I_,5:5:.ff 61:1! 1i,9e7: 2_g' -Iifi_ 99 18%, I:,.7_-
11_7._ 1:,_1:_ 6_, 2-,2_/. 310' -Y.2_ l_ )05: 2',t03,
1t_8"0, Z, ,_." ?_I_" 3_5 2_ Sl 5 -250_ 2:38: %OZ_. 2, ,722:
B-9_II 3_,2_ _ _,2X_? _8_ -l_ 36"9: 1_:,2_9' 3:, 0_'_
,$ : 1
I._2- 3 ,,7_I= I:,:/fi_ 5_,:i_:_ I:,::2-I': _I"I_:, _0. -11,,I_:5_ 3:,_:_(i;
11_.7_:-89: Lry, flF,1 ', 1_,3_' 2 L,,_-7i; 3=,5:t1_ -!!,,1,3_: 1_,E-,go 4_,D9_B I_7:,,T_
I_73:_"7_: 3_,W40' 800. 6,.73_3_ I;7.7.. -3_: 4_5, 2_, 6_,ASW:
_'_._CC._. :, _'- _: ,... " _ . . , .:. : _ . . .
::.97t,-82
....:..x_.._-pFne_ •:iO .,50i .7B1 219
74-.'77
:<.'_r_a ,09 ]. .267 , .860 . t40.
t'i".a.l ipp:i.nes ,076 .362 .831 ,,i69
:.9'7!_-82
F':_i.iipp _ne.a .:)7.9 ,,.3_':_ .723 .277
Total Ad_.l_:__:'me,_:_i::._ ..... "..... ' ..... _ * ' "_"
]9 ....
_o re.,.. 2 136 ; >_ :!4 _ '>" ':
P_li,lip p iue,_ .2'39 ofi6 3 -,, _ .,'¢_ .,'_',.',._
_9 ;_4-77
........... _ ..... R
Kor,_.,_ l ,_586 , _:_70 _,:,0;%.5 o?.,_.,,':
_'i'_d.:li :;_ ia.t: _ 005,2 ,72.0 -- t, _:._:i_7 :_. 723
_q79-82
Eore_ i. ,,52 .3zo8 .5.] 0 .......; _.
Pl_f.i.i_pi_e_ .302 ,.8_'..5_' _,0?,6 o2.:..:[
.!.,/Tr_ie _s _:h_ average o:£ e:_,.o_'_s _id in_p.er_:_:,
T&ble _, Y_iati_e £_ortm_ce of _zade
Ad_lsc_te: • Kocea a_d Phil£pp£_e_e 1974-82
P_r.Lod Expo_L Shar_e " ]L_i_o_ Shar_ / S]Loue¢ Growth !report: Subs_;iCutior_
¢oCal [xporce Chsnse in Exports T'ocal: 1mporta ToccL Imt_orcs
KOruna .302 .920 .059 .114
_3__i.._._pp-£ne_ ,101 ,. 718 -.02"2 ,032
K_x:_e , .31.7 ,867 -,_ 017 ,,1,'_
P_,.i,_.ippineo .005 .222 -. 023 .028
i97%-82
_o_e,_. .106 .983 .126 .03._
Ph_Lippi.nea ,099 ,953 .,,, 003 , O17
_- Final ezport share is_export shaze_ in the final yea_p _hiCt_ _en divided
_y _he change in expor_e _ho_ the _ropo_tio_ of the latter _ha_ is accoun_ed
fo_ _ by _acrea_d _xpox_ _ha_e.
Souzce: Table_ 3_
Table 7 • Saving and Tnveecment Ratios:
Kozea, 1971-82
(Per cant of G_P)
Year . Gz_aa G_rosa DomeSt£c ForeiSn Goveramenc
lnvest_n r $&V_g ,Saving Savins
!971 25,4 14.6 10.8 2.3
i972 21.5 16.4 5, l -1.8
1923 26. l 22.2 3.9 l.O
_74 31.6 19.0 12.6 0.3
!97_ 29.4 _9,0 10,4 -0,2
_976 25,5 23.i 2.4 1.6
i_77 26_9 26.3 0.6 21.2
t_78 30.6 27,4 3.2 2.9
;_.979 35.0 27,5 7,5 5.1
_A_O 31.1 21. ] 10.0 2.6
!9_1 28.2 20.3 7.9 2.9
_,982 26.2 21.4 4.8 O, 1
Avg. 1971-73 24.3 17.7 6.6 0_5
;_,v_. 1974-77 28.3 21.8 6,5 1_2
Avg.. 1979-82 30,1 22.5 7._ 2,,7
l_vt_,, 1974-82 29.4 22,7. 6.6 2.I
Source: Asian Devalopman_ Bank, Ke_ Indicator_ April and October, 1983.
•_hilSppiues, !971-82
(Per Ce._to_ _P)
•(]rOSs Gross Doeiescic Forei_ C_ z_t
In_s_e_nC $&vi_g Savi_S _,aving
_!L;"_ L:2 [_3 .20.0 " 1.3' 2.6
_9__,', 20.6 18.9 i,7 1.6
-._73. 19.9 23.2 -3.3 5.7
_.'.__, 26,7 24.0 2.7 4.9
_'.,__.5 31, ), 24, Z 7,0 4.0
.}.97_ 31.2 23.8 7,4 2,0
I_;'? 28._ 24.2 4,4 3.2
i_7_J 27,9 22.3 5.6 3,8
1979 31,0 25, 8 5.2 5.2
;.;_ 30oG 24.7 5.9 $.0
....... 29.8 23,_. 5.9 4, I
_9_2 29.5 21.,S 8.0 3.6
A._g, _971-73 • 20,6 20.7, ,_0, I _,3
_k_g. I97#.-,77 2_..4 2_,.0 " _,4 3.5
• vg. t 979--8Z 30,2 Za. (I 6. Z 4.5
Av_. 1974L82 29.6 23.8 5.8 4.0
3_>._rce_ AaiaxtDeve&opmmnt B_k) _ _._-_¢.ors_ A_r£.1_d (_c_ober, 198_.
.able _, _o_ sud Real!/ _xc_se _ces:
Korea _d Pl_£1ipplnaa, 1971-82
(W_ and paso per U.S. dollar)
J
'/_:_r gom_el Trade UniC Val_ _1 _om_n_ Trade Unit Value P_al
_-73 380 1.00 380 6,62 1,00 6,62
_?_ 400 1.12 448 6.79 1.36 9.26
/_ 484 .88 t25 7.25 I. 12 8. I_
_: ;_ 484 .78 378 7.44 .96 7.16
_..'_?7 484 . 71 3A5 7.40 ,90 6,65
Y'_7_ 48/, . b4 308 7.37 .91 6.70
_ __._7 484 .66 317 7.38 .95 7.04
!/_._0 60 7 .60 362 7.51 .96 7.04
1_ 681 .53 362 7.90 .84 6.b_)
_97/_ 746 _t .46 345 9.17 .71 6.53
i--/Re_t exctumge rarm.s are no,_naL exchanse raL:ea mu_C£pl_ed by _:rade
_n£_ value and d_v£ded by GI_P¢befla_or.
2/Trade unit va].ue £e si_q_le average of e_t_el_t z_d :/_rt ui_f.t: v._....
Source: Aa£an Oev_lep_mut I_ank, Kq,y l:nd_cet:ozs, _r£1 and Ocr.ober, 1983.
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